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Abstract: Nietzschean pragmatism is the view that one should believe whatever 
best promotes life, even things that are untrue because they fail to correspond 
to reality. Nietzsche expresses this view in early sections of Beyond Good and 
Evil. While he rejects all objective value including that of truth, his view that 
passions can give their objects subjective value suggests valuing beliefs that pro-
mote life. The second essay of the Untimely Meditations applies Nietzschean 
pragmatism to the study of history.
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Nietzsche holds that one should believe what best promotes life, and he 
also accepts the correspondence theory of truth. I’ll call this conjunction 
of views Nietzschean pragmatism. This article provides textual evidence 
for attributing this pragmatist position to Nietzsche and explains how his 
broader metaethical views led him to it.
The following section introduces Nietzschean pragmatism, discuss-
ing how Nietzsche expresses it in BGE, and distinguishing it from William 
James’s pragmatism about truth. The second section explains how Nietzsche’s 
 skepticism about values that can’t be grounded in individual passion attracted 
him to this kind of pragmatism. The third section explores an early application 
of Nietzschean pragmatism to history in the second essay of UM. I conclude 
by considering how Nietzsche developed his pragmatism.
Nietzschean Pragmatism in Beyond Good and Evil
Nietzschean pragmatism combines the view that one should believe what 
best promotes life with the correspondence theory of truth. BGE 1 and 4 
are among Nietzsche’s clearest expressions of such a view, and I’ll discuss 
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each of them at length here. I’ll also contrast Nietzschean pragmatism with 
William James’s pragmatism about truth, which doesn’t raise the questions 
Nietzsche discusses in BGE 1 or allow for the striking claims Nietzsche 
makes in BGE 4.
BGE 1 raises the question that Nietzschean pragmatism will answer. 
Nietzsche mentions the “will to truth” in the first sentence while inquiring 
about how this will figures in our psychology. Then Nietzsche describes 
how our “long halt at the question about the cause of this will” was fol-
lowed by “a complete stop before a still more basic question. We asked 
about the value of this will. Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? 
and uncertainty? even ignorance?” This is how “the problem of the value of 
truth came before us.”1
Nietzsche announces his answer and solution in BGE 4, which begins: 
“The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judg-
ment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question 
is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, 
perhaps even species-cultivating.” Here the questions whether a judgment 
is true and whether it’s useful with regard to promoting life and cultivating 
the species are sharply distinguished. Nietzsche emphasizes these practi-
cal goals over truth. In some situations, making true judgments might be 
the best way to achieve practical goals—in particular, when we’re trying 
to figure out which course of action will best promote life or cultivate the 
species. When true judgments are important for realizing these practical 
values, the falseness of a judgment will give us reason to reject it. But as 
Nietzsche notes at the beginning, truth is not always aligned with practical 
value in such a way.
He then provides examples of judgments that he takes to be valuable 
for life but false, writing that “we are fundamentally inclined to claim that 
the falsest judgments (which include the synthetic judgments a priori) 
are the most indispensable for us; that without accepting the fictions of 
logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the 
unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the 
world by means of numbers, man could not live—that renouncing false 
judgments would mean renouncing life and a denial of life.” Here he treats 
some of the most fundamental human judgments as life-promoting but 
false. While philosophers including Plato contemplate promoting their 
political goals by convincing people of “noble lies,” these beliefs aren’t as 
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fundamental to human thought as logic, identity, and number. In rejecting 
the truth of judgments invoking these concepts as well as the other judg-
ments that Immanuel Kant lists as synthetic a priori (which include causal 
judgments), Nietzsche treats false belief as essential for human life. While 
one might say to Plato that the noble lies aren’t actually needed, much 
of our activity in the simplest parts of everyday life would be impossible 
if everyone joined Nietzsche in rejecting logic, identity, and number. As 
judgments involving number, logic, and identity are necessary for achiev-
ing nearly any goal we might have, believing only the true would indeed 
mean renouncing life.
Why these beliefs end up being so useful despite being false would 
be  an interesting question to ask Nietzsche. Doesn’t their utility result 
from how they support accurate predictions of observed phenomena? 
And then, why isn’t this predictive accuracy evidence that they corre-
spond to a reality that causes the observations we make? Such argu-
ments are often made by scientific realists against their instrumentalist 
opponents.2 But as my focus is primarily interpretive, I’ll set such issues 
aside here.
Nietzsche ends the section by recognizing how radical his view is: “To 
recognize untruth as a condition of life—that certainly means resisting 
accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks 
this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil” (BGE 4). 
These passages from BGE express a distinctively pragmatic conception of 
epistemic value on which the best beliefs to hold will be false ones, if true 
beliefs don’t help as much in achieving certain practical goals. But BGE 1 
and 4 show that Nietzsche doesn’t accept a pragmatist theory of truth like 
that of the American pragmatist William James, who writes: “‘The true,’ to 
put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 
‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in 
almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of 
course.”3 Nietzsche’s pragmatism is about what one ought to believe, while 
James’s pragmatism is about truth itself. If Nietzsche accepted James’s prag-
matist theory of truth, he wouldn’t be able to tell us that false beliefs were 
useful for life. The usefulness of these beliefs would, on James’s pragma-
tist theory of truth, make them true. Since Nietzsche is concerned to tell 
us that the most useful beliefs can be false ones, he cannot have this sort 
of pragmatist theory of truth. Maudemarie Clark also notes this point in 
arguing against Arthur Danto’s pragmatic interpretation: “Nietzsche, in 
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fact, insisted repeatedly that knowledge of the truth may conflict with the 
satisfaction of practical interests.”4
To put the point another way, Nietzsche presents the question of why 
truth has value in BGE 1 as a serious and difficult one that brings us to a 
“complete stop.” If he accepted a pragmatic theory of truth as James did, 
the question would be easy to answer. Since James identifies the true with 
the useful, truth would then acquire whatever value useful things have. 
Combining pragmatism about epistemic value with pragmatism about 
truth provides a straightforward defense of the value of truth. But Nietzsche 
doesn’t offer such a straightforward defense, and he doesn’t think the ques-
tion of why truth has value is so easily answered. This shows that Nietzsche 
cannot be combining his pragmatism about epistemic value with pragma-
tism about truth.
I follow Clark in attributing a correspondence theory of truth to 
Nietzsche. This is the traditional view of truth: true beliefs are those that 
correspond with reality. My purpose here is just to contrast the corre-
spondence theory with the pragmatist theory of truth, so I won’t explore 
the finer details of what variety of correspondence theory Nietzsche held. 
Nietzsche’s view may also be indeterminate between the correspondence 
theory and deflationary views that retain many features of the correspon-
dence theory. I won’t draw these distinctions, as the contrast between 
correspondence-like views and pragmatism is the important one for our 
purposes.
The chart below presents the results of combining correspondence and 
pragmatist theories of truth with truth-oriented and pragmatic theories of 
epistemic value:
table. 1 | <caption to come>






Standard view: believe 
the true, whether or 
not it’s useful
Nietzschean pragmatism: 
believe the useful, whether 




(1): believe the true, 
which is the useful
James’s pragmatism (2): 
believe the useful, which is 
the true
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“Useful” here refers to any kind of practical value, not including the 
intrinsic value that truth is taken to have on standard nonpragmatist views. 
Nietzsche and James had very different theories of value, and I use “useful” 
broadly to span these differences. I use “epistemic” here and throughout 
this article to mean “regarding belief.” I do not use it to imply any strong 
or direct connection to truth, as some users of the term do. So as I use the 
terms, being a pragmatist about epistemic value is consistent with rejecting 
the value of truth.
As the chart indicates, the correspondence theory of truth and pragma-
tism about epistemic value are the only combination where we might be right 
to believe useful things that fail to be true. Nietzsche tells us to do this in BGE 
4, giving us strong evidence that this is Nietzsche’s view. On James’s pragma-
tist theory of truth, the true and the useful merge, eliminating this possibility. 
Either we should believe the true, which James identifies with the useful; or we 
should believe the useful, which James identifies with the true. I don’t know 
which of these very similar versions of pragmatism belong to James. They tell 
us to believe the same things in all possible situations, differing only hyperin-
tensionally with regard to the content and explanatory structure of epistemic 
normativity. But since the questions of BGE 1 and the bold statement of BGE 
4 make sense only if Nietzsche accepted both the correspondence theory of 
truth and pragmatism about epistemic value, this combination deserves to be 
called “Nietzschean pragmatism.”
Whether or not Nietzschean pragmatism is the right view about epis-
temic norms, it intuitively seems like a conceptually coherent position. 
There is no incoherence or implicit contradiction in claiming that we 
should believe the useful rather than the true. The conceptual coherence of 
Nietzschean pragmatism provides an objection to views of belief like those 
of Nishi Shah and David Velleman. They think it is part of the concept of 
belief that the norm of truth applies to it.5
Metaethical Motivations for Pragmatism about epistemic Value
Nietzsche’s metaethical concerns are part of what makes pragmatism about 
epistemic value so appealing to him. Since he doesn’t believe in objective 
value, he can’t regard truth as objectively valuable. But since he takes pas-
sions to give their objects subjective value, he values beliefs that have the 
right kinds of relations to passions and their objects.
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A great deal of textual evidence suggests interpreting Nietzsche as an 
error theorist about moral value, which is supposed to be objective. Clear 
statements of error theory appear as early as D, where he asserts that “it is 
errors which, as the basis of all moral judgment, impel men to their moral 
actions [. . .]. I deny morality as I deny alchemy: but I do not deny that 
there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in 
accordance with them—I also deny immorality: not that countless people 
feel themselves to be immoral, but that there is any true reason so to feel” 
(D 103). He expresses a very similar view seven years later in TI, this time 
likening morality to religion instead of alchemy: “There are altogether no 
moral facts. Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in real-
ities which are no realities” (TI “Improvers” 1). Many other passages state 
error theory about morality in similarly clear and forceful terms.6
Nietzsche thinks we lack evidence that objective moral facts exist, just 
as we lack evidence that God exists. The same epistemological and meta-
physical principles that lead to atheism will also lead to error theory about 
morality. He writes, “When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the 
right to Christian morality out from under one’s feet. This morality is by no 
means self-evident: this point has to be exhibited again and again, despite the 
English flatheads” (TI “Skirmishes” 5). Even fifteen years before G. E. Moore, 
he explains their error: “the English actually believe that they know ‘intu-
itively’ what is good and evil” (TI “Skirmishes” 5). Nietzsche thinks that 
objective moral facts would have to be additional facts over and above those 
that compose the natural world, and takes us to have no good evidence for 
facts of this kind. He rejects intuition as way of achieving this moral knowl-
edge, just as he rejects revelation as a way of knowing that God exists.
If we cannot rely on intuition or anything else for evidence of objective 
moral facts, it’s hard to see how we could acquire evidence that truth has 
objective value. Even if we take truth to have a nonmoral kind of objective 
value, to avoid a direct contradiction with the rejection of objective moral 
value, we will be left with no good story about how we know that truth has 
this value. As Nietzsche sees it, the same principles that force us to atheism 
and to error theory about morality also force us to reject the objective value 
of truth. This is how the “problem of the value of truth” in BGE 1 comes 
before us.
While Nietzsche rejects objective value, he accepts that our passions 
can give things value of a subjective and nonmoral kind.7 Values of taste 
are often understood this way. If Ariadne desires wine but not beer, wine 
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is good for Ariadne but beer is not. Subjective value is always indexed to 
some valuer whose passion makes its object valuable in this way. Moral 
value is not supposed to be valuable merely for a particular person but not 
for others, so this can’t be a moral kind of value. Aesthetic value is plausibly 
regarded as subjective, however. If Mengxi has passions only for traditional 
Chinese music and Carrie has passions only for 1990s riot grrrl bands, the 
former will have value for Mengxi and the latter will have value for Carrie. 
But the favorite music of each won’t have value for the other.
The subjectivist view that having value just is being the object of passion 
avoids the epistemological and metaphysical problems with objective value. 
Since we know that passions and some of their objects exist, we know that 
some things have value. The passions and their objects are sufficient for 
constituting the existence of the value. And since there aren’t deep meta-
physical problems with the existence of passions or the existence of most 
of their objects, subjective value doesn’t in general pose deep metaphysical 
problems. The things that constitute subjective value fit nicely into a natu-
ralistic picture of reality.
Clear textual evidence suggesting that Nietzsche’s own values are sub-
jective appears in Z. In “On the Spirit of Gravity,” he writes, “He, however, 
has discovered himself who says, ‘this is my good and evil’; with that he has 
reduced to silence the mole and dwarf who say, ‘Good for all, evil for all.’” 
He concludes the section by saying, “‘This is my way; where is yours?’—thus 
I answered those who asked me ‘the way.’ For the way—that does not exist.” 
Here Zarathustra rejects objective value in favor of subjective value indexed 
to individuals as the subjectivist formula suggests.
A particularly beautiful statement of subjectivism appears in “On 
Enjoying and Suffering the Passions,” where Zarathustra tells us how to talk 
about what we love:
If you must speak of her, then do not be ashamed to stammer 
of her. Then speak and stammer: “This is my good; this I love; it 
pleases me wholly; thus alone do I want the good. I do not want 
it as divine law; I do not want it as human statute and need: it 
shall not be a signpost for me to overearths and paradises. It is 
an earthly virtue that I love: there is little prudence in it, and least 
of all the reason of all men. But this bird built its nest within me, 
therefore I love and caress it; now it dwells with me, sitting on 
its golden eggs.” Thus you shall stammer and praise your virtue.
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Here Zarathustra specifically rejects several metaethical conceptions of 
value as objective or grounded outside individual passion—for example, 
as “divine law” or issuing from “the reason of all men.” He instead sees the 
good as grounded in “love.” Lanier Anderson has asked why Zarathustra 
tells us to “stammer” about it; I think Nietzsche is acknowledging that 
speech about such value will not live up to the standards of discourse that 
states objective facts. So we will fall short of the standard requirements for 
good discourse, much as a stammerer does. But since all value is subjective, 
and since it is worth violating these requirements to talk about value, we 
shouldn’t be ashamed.
Zarathustra nicely describes how passion constructs subjective value in 
“On the Thousand and One Goals”: “The fire of love glows in the names 
of all the virtues, and the fire of wrath. Zarathustra saw many lands and 
many peoples. No greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than the 
works of the lovers: ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are their names.” This kind of good 
and evil, rooted in the transitory passions of human beings, is the only 
kind that Nietzsche believes in. As Zarathustra says concisely in “On Self-
Overcoming”: “good and evil that are not transitory, do not exist.”
This subjectivist picture makes it easy for beliefs to have instrumental 
value as means to achieving the objects of our passions. True beliefs are 
especially likely to have this value, as false beliefs often lead to failure in 
achieving the objects of passion. But if false belief in numbers or causal 
necessity is useful in delivering the objects of passion (as BGE 4 suggests), 
they may have instrumental value as well. If some beliefs play a role in our 
psychological economy that enables us to form and maintain particular 
passions, or to act in passionate ways that a fully developed Nietzschean 
evaluative theory might endorse, they might be instrumental in constitut-
ing value and not just in realizing it.
Pragmatism about epistemic value provides an excellent account of how 
beliefs can be instrumentally valuable. In summarizing this kind of prag-
matism above, I characterized it as telling us to “believe the useful.” A belief 
that helps us achieve the objects of our passions is useful in a very obvious 
kind of way. If our evaluative theory tells us that having strong passions and 
acting on them is itself valuable, beliefs that help us cultivate our passions 
and act on them will be useful too. There may be even more ways in which 
truth attains instrumental value by allowing passions to operate in the best 
way they can. This is how Nietzsche’s subjectivism naturally leads him to 
pragmatism about epistemic value.
62 | J o u r N a l  o f  N i e t z S c h e  S t u d i e S
JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 62 04/01/17  3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 63 04/01/17  3:27 PM
For those who have sufficiently strong passions for truth, truth itself 
could have noninstrumental value. The value would still be subjective since 
it is grounded in individual passion, but it would be noninstrumental, as 
some of the value of pleasure and survival are. Since we have passions for 
pleasure and for survival themselves, regardless of what they might bring 
about, these things have value for us as ends and not merely as means. 
(They may also have value as means—survival certainly does.) A passion 
simply for knowing the truth would give truth similar value. Subjectivism 
also allows false beliefs to have noninstrumental value for those whose pas-
sions favor them. A passion for having a particular kind of belief whether or 
not it’s true would give that belief value regardless of its truth. And a passion 
for false belief would give false belief the same kind of intrinsic subjective 
value that true belief has to lovers of truth.
Since Nietzsche phrases his pragmatism in terms of the value of vari-
ous beliefs for life, while subjectivism has our passions creating value, the 
relationship between life and passion should be clarified. In “Nietzsche on 
Life’s Ends,” John Richardson explores what it means for something to be 
valuable for life, interpreting him as holding that “values arise only by and 
in (biological) life’s end-directedness and the valuing this involves. They 
are the intentional objects of the valuing life engages in.”8 To be more pre-
cise about how this end-directedness is realized, Richardson writes that 
Nietzsche “thinks that an ‘animal’ kind of valuing operates in us all the time, 
in the ‘part’ of us that we call our body. I’ll refer to this lower level of valuing 
in us as body values; these are the ends in us that we share with other living 
things. Nietzsche speaks of this valuing whenever he speaks of our drives.”9
Passion seems to be the psychological location of the animal valuing 
that constitutes life’s ends on Richardson’s view. Passions are encoded in our 
neurobiological structures. Many passions are instinctual, difficult for cul-
tural influences to eliminate, and shared with other living things. In ordi-
nary folk-psychological discourse, we use “passion,” “drive,” and “desire” 
more or less interchangeably. These terms refer to mental states that con-
stitute their objects as valuable on desire-satisfaction views of value, and 
which drive all human motivation on the Humean theory of motivation. 
Identifying passions with body values and the objects of passion with the 
valued things is the position that this leads to, and which I attribute to him.
Here I will not be able to address the challenging interpretive ques-
tion of which developments of passion Nietzsche sees as constituting the 
advancement and decline of life. While Nietzsche’s remarks on this issue 
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give us some clear examples of what he sees as advancement and decline 
(for example, that he regards the passionate creative activity of artists as 
an expression of advancing life), he doesn’t present a clear general theory 
in any of his published works, and the question of what precise theory 
might most accurately fit the shape of his thoughts is too difficult for me to 
explore here.10
The fairly general claim that I’ll assume for the rest of the article is 
that beliefs have their value because of their relation to passion, such that 
furthering the ability of artists to express their creative passions will give 
beliefs value. While true beliefs can have value in this way, false beliefs can 
as well. This thought is at the heart of Nietzschean pragmatism.
the Second Untimely Meditation: Nietzschean Pragmatism 
applied to history
Now I’ll turn to an early expression of Nietzschean pragmatism applied to 
the study of history. As Nietzsche recognizes, a culture’s understanding of 
history both consists in its beliefs about the past and affects its present char-
acter. So Nietzsche’s discussion of historiography in UM provides a nice 
example of how he evaluates epistemic phenomena that have practical sig-
nificance. True to Nietzschean pragmatism, he evaluates various methods 
of studying history by examining their effects to life, praising them insofar 
as they promote life, and faulting them insofar as they fail to do so.
Nietzsche’s discussion of historiography begins with a quotation 
from Goethe, who, as Brian Leiter notes,11 is the German whom he most 
admired: “In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without 
augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.” Nietzsche’s commentary 
on the quotation displays his pragmatic evaluative commitments:
For its intention is to show why instruction without invigoration, 
why knowledge not attended by action, why history as a costly 
superfluity and luxury, must, to use Goethe’s word, be seriously 
hated by us—hated because we still lack even the things we need 
and the superfluous is the enemy of the necessary. We need his-
tory, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those for 
which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it, even though 
he may look nobly down on our rough and charmless needs and 
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requirements. We need it, that is to say, for the sake of life and 
action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life and action, 
let alone for the purpose of extenuating the selfseeking life and 
the base and cowardly action. We want to serve history only to 
the extent that history serves life: for it is possible to value the 
study of history to such a degree that life becomes stunted and 
degenerate [. . .]. (HL Foreword)
Nietzsche recognizes that broad historical understanding isn’t intrinsically 
very important for the promotion of life. It might be instrumentally valu-
able for guiding life-promoting policy decisions or for providing a new 
perspective on one’s personal life choices, but it also might not have such 
effects. Nietzsche describes how “a man’s historical sense and knowledge 
can be very limited, his horizon as narrow as that of a dweller in the Alps, all 
his judgments may involve injustice and he may falsely suppose that all his 
experiences are original to him—yet in spite of this injustice and error he 
will nonetheless stand there in superlative health and vigor, a joy to all who 
see him; while close beside him a man far more just and instructed than he 
sickens and collapses because the lines of his horizon are always restlessly 
changing, because he can no longer extricate himself from the delicate net 
of his judiciousness and truth for a simple act of will and desire” (HL 1). 
Historical understanding doesn’t necessarily serve life, and it can in fact be 
pursued and exhibited in a way that provides an impediment to life’s further 
development.
Sympathizing with Nietzsche’s criticism of historical knowledge that 
doesn’t serve life and action is easy when one considers his graduate edu-
cation in classical philology. Learning many aspects of ancient history can 
give us a broader perspective on our own lives, and it helps us appreciate 
the sheer diversity of forms that human nature and society have taken. But 
it’s hard for most of us to see similar value in learning the grammatical 
intricacies of ancient languages for their own sake as philologists do. While 
philologists’ precise and detailed knowledge of ancient grammar may be 
instrumentally helpful when they try to draw insight from ancient texts, 
knowledge of these details is not, in itself, an object of most of our passions. 
Spending years in a postgraduate program built around pursuing knowl-
edge of this kind without concern for its broader applicability to life may 
have impressed this fact on Nietzsche, and led him to a distinctively prag-
matist view of the study of history.
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After making it clear to readers how history might fail to serve life, 
Nietzsche expresses the purpose of the second essay: “Let us at least learn 
better how to employ history for the purpose of life!” (HL 1). The monumen-
tal, antiquarian, and critical modes of history, which Nietzsche discusses at 
length in this essay, are introduced and evaluated as ways that history might 
be employed for the benefit of life. Nietzsche contrasts these modes of his-
toriography with an approach that pursues knowledge for knowledge’s sake: 
“These are the services history is capable of performing for life; every man 
and every nation requires, in accordance with its goals, energies and needs, 
a certain kind of knowledge of the past, now in the form of monumental, 
now of antiquarian, now of critical history: but it does not require it as a 
host of pure thinkers who only look on at life, of knowledge-thirsty individ-
uals whom knowledge alone will satisfy and to whom the accumulation of 
knowledge is itself the goal, but always and only for the ends of life and thus 
also under the domination and supreme direction of these ends” (HL 4). As 
I’ll describe, Nietzsche’s evaluation of the various modes of history is fun-
damentally pragmatic, focusing on their utility for life rather than whether 
they help us grasp objective historical truth.
The monumental mode of history presents us with examples of heroic 
people doing great deeds. Nietzsche sees it as advancing life by inspiring the 
person “who fights a great fight, who needs models, teachers, comforters 
and cannot find them among his contemporaries” (HL 2). He describes how 
such people might be energized by their predecessors’ triumphs over obsta-
cles. In light of how much his philosophy emphasizes great people doing 
great deeds, the significance of this role for monumentalist history wouldn’t 
have been lost on him. But Nietzsche also recognizes that monumentalist 
history can be an impediment to doing great deeds in the present. He pro-
vides a vivid image of how “inartistic natures” might use monumentalist 
history against “strong artistic spirits” when “a half-understood monument 
to some great era of the past is erected as an idol and zealously danced 
around, as though to say: ‘Behold, this is true art: pay no heed to those who 
are evolving and want something new!’” (HL 2).
The antiquarian mode of history helps us better appreciate things in our 
lives by putting them in the context of a venerated past. Nietzsche writes 
that “this antiquarian sense of veneration of the past is of the greatest value 
when it spreads a simple feeling of pleasure and contentment over the mod-
est; rude, even wretched conditions in which a man or a nation lives” (HL 3). 
But antiquarian history creates disadvantages for life when it traps one 
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within the past, making one satisfied with insignificant things only because 
they’re the same things that satisfied one’s ancestors. Under these circum-
stances, new artistic forms and creative developments to which the passions 
of the living drive them can be denigrated and rejected in comparison to 
venerated works of the past. Antiquarian history becomes harmful for life 
when it “paralyses the man of action who, as one who acts, will and must 
offend some piety or other” (HL 3).
Critical history, which “judges and condemns” the past (HL 2), pro-
vides an especially illuminating development of Nietzschean pragmatism. 
Critical history dissolves and destroys historical ideas that no longer serve 
life, clearing away the excesses of monumentalist and antiquarian history 
when they obstruct the development of life. It does so by carefully examin-
ing and condemning the past. While Nietzsche doesn’t go into great detail 
about how critical history could injure life, he does describe critical history 
as a “dangerous process, especially so for life itself ” (HL 3). Presumably his 
thought is that monumental history provides inspiration and antiquarian 
history provides contentment, so critical history might by destroying them 
leave us unable to find inspiration or contentment in history.
In Nietzsche’s remarks about how critical history relates to a just 
appraisal of the past, we get a clear picture of how the judgments of life 
might tend toward historical truth.
If he is to live, man must possess and from time to time employ 
the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past: he does 
this by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining 
it and finally condemning it; every past, however, is worthy to 
be condemned—for that is the nature of human things: human 
violence and weakness have always played a mighty role in them. 
It is not justice which here sits in judgment; it is even less mercy 
which pronounces the verdict: it is life alone, that dark, driv-
ing power that insatiably thirsts for itself. Its sentence is always 
unmerciful, always unjust, because it has never proceeded out of 
a pure well of knowledge; but in most cases the sentence would 
be the same even if it were pronounced by justice itself. (HL 3)
I take “justice” in this passage to be whatever would have the strength to 
resist powerful biases and provide an impartial view of history. Nietzsche 
tells us that critical history doesn’t come from such a perspective. Instead, 
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it comes from the perspective of life. The past is condemned not by forces 
impartially seeking objective truth, but from new living forces of the pres-
ent oppressed by excessive veneration of the past. But this allows critical 
history to be a process that discovers the truth in a large proportion of 
actual cases. Despite the partiality of critical history, it often pronounces 
the same sentence as justice would, simply because human violence and 
weakness are ubiquitous.
This passage suggests that there is a place for truth in Nietzschean prag-
matist practice. While Nietzschean pragmatists won’t value truth for its 
own sake, their judgments will in most cases coincide with the truth. In 
many ordinary cases, error is an impediment to achieving passion’s ends. 
The judgments that serve life’s purposes often happen to be true.
Nietzsche’s Path to his Pragmatism
Readers may have noticed that I have discussed Nietzsche’s works in the 
reverse of the order in which they were published. I began with the official 
statements of Nietzschean pragmatism in BGE, published in 1886. Discussing 
Zarathustra, published between 1883 and 1885, I presented the metaethical 
problem for objective value that led Nietzsche to this view. Finally, I came to 
the applications of this view in UM, published in the mid-1870s. Why?
The process by which a theory reveals itself to proponents may differ 
from the process by which the theory is most clearly explained in a journal 
article. Here I’ve presented Nietzsche’s view by clearly stating it, presenting 
the theoretical considerations that motivated it, and then demonstrating its 
application to a question of practical significance. This, I thought, would be 
the clearest presentation of Nietzsche’s view of epistemic value. Nietzsche 
himself seems to have begun with pragmatist answers to the questions of 
practical significance, and then after considering metaethical problems 
with regarding truth as objectively valuable, arrived at a theory of epistemic 
value that reflected his views on practical questions. In passages like BGE 3, 
he often describes philosophers as arriving at their theoretical views by 
beginning from more immediately practical motivations. The way he devel-
oped his pragmatism bears out his own metaphilosophical theory.
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